Koestler on precognition, psitrons and the exercise of will

"[In order to explain precognition, Adrian Dobbs proposes] a five-dimensional universe with three spatial and two temporal dimensions . . . The arrow of time, progressing along the second time dimension, moves through a probabilistic, instead of a deterministic world; and it resembles less an arrow than a wave front . . . The anticipation of future events follows the second time dimension, where "objective probabilities" play the same part as causal relations in classical physics.

"Information about [these objective probabilities] is conveyed to the subject by hypothetical messengers which Dobbs calls 'psitrons' and which operate in his second time dimension . . . [The psitron] has [negative or] imaginary mass and thus, according to Relativity Theory, can travel faster than light indefinitely, without the loss of momentum.

"In modern quantum theory, processes involving negative or imaginary mass are all in a day's work, so to speak. Professor Margenau of Yale University has given us a picturesque description of this state of affairs:

'At the forefront of current physical research, we find it necessary to invoke the existence of 'virtual processes' confined to extremely short durations. For a very short time, every physical process can proceed in ways which defy the laws of nature known today, always hiding itself under the cloak of the principle of uncertainty. When any physical process first starts, it sends out 'feelers' in all directions, feelers in which time may be reversed, normal rules are violated, and unexpected things may happen. These virtual processes then die out and after a certain time matters settle down again. [compressed]'

"Professor Bohm of Birkbeck College, University of London, emphasizes the same point in his book Quantum Theory:

"The preceding decsription [of certain quantum phenomena] involves the replacement of the classical notion that a system moves along some definite path, by the idea that under the influence of the perturbing potential the system tends to make transitions in all directions at once. Only certain types of transitions can, however, proceed indefinitely in the same direction, namely those . . . called real transitions to distinguish them from the so-called virtual transitions which do not conserve energy, and which must therefore reverse before they have gone too far. This terminology is unfortunate, because it implies that virtual transitions have no real effects. On the contrary, they are often of the greatest importance, for a great many physical processes are the result of the so-called virtual transitions.'

"In his paper, Dobbs quotes this passage, and comments:

'I have quoted this passage at length because the quantum theory of virtual transitions is closely related to the notion I have been suggesting, of an actual state of an entity . . . being surrounded in imaginary time with an array of objective probabilities, which are not necessarily actualized, but nonetheless influence the actual course of events . . . As Bohm says, we have to consider the system as, so to speak, trying out tentatively all the possible potentialities out of which one actuality emerges. Now we can picture these virtual potentialities or probability amplitudes as a swarm of particles of imaginary mass, interacting together like frictionless gas . . .'

"This swarm, or cloud, or 'patterned set' of psitrons of imaginary mass, impinging on neurons in the percipient's brain, which are in a particularly receptive condition, would transmit not only information about the actual state of the system that emits them, but also 'pre-casts' of its inherently probable future state, which are already reflected in the 'feelers in all directions' which it sends out . . . On the critical question [of] how the hypothetical psitrons could convey information [directly] to the percipient's brain, short-circuiting, as it were, the sensory apparatus, Dobbs resorted to a theory advanced some years ago by Sir John Eccles.

"In the last chapter of his textbook on The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind, Eccles launched what he called a 'Hypothesis of the mode of operation of 'Will' on the cerebral cortex.' The hypothesis is not concerned with precognition, but what it says about the interaction of mind and matter is pertinent to the subject, and I shall have to quote it at some length.

'It is a psychological fact that we believe we have ability to control or modify our actions by the exercise of 'will', and in practical life all sane men assume that they have this ability. By stimulation of the motor-cortex [of the exposed brain of patients undergoing a brain operation] it is possible to evoke complex motor acts in a conscious human subject. The subject reports that the experience is quite different from that occurring when he "willed" a movement . . . In one case there was the experience of having 'willed' an action, which was missing in the other.

'It is not here contended that all action is 'willed'. There can be no doubt that a great part of the skilled activity devolving from the cerebral cortex is stereotyped and automatic, and may be likened to the control of breathing by the respiratory centers. But it is contended that it is possible voluntarily to assume control of such actions, even of the most trivial kind, just as we may within limits exercise voluntary control over our breathing . . .

'An important neurophysiological problem arises as soon as we attempt to consider in detail events that would occur in the cerebral cortex when, by the exercise of 'will', there is some change in response to a given situation . . ."

"Eccles then proceeds to work out a concise theory of how a minute 'will-influence', affecting a single neuron in the cortex, could trigger off very considerable changes in brain activity. The trigger-action would affect neurons which are 'critically poised', as he puts it, i.e., in unstable equilibrium, just below the threshold of discharging a nerve impulse. In view of the fact that there are some forty thousand neurons packed together per square millimeter (approximately 1/700 square inch) of the cerebral cortex, and that each neuron has several hundred synaptic connections with other neurons, we have here a network of such density and complexity that

'in the active cerebral cortex within twenty milliseconds, the pattern of discharge of even hundreds of thousands of neurons would be modified as a result of an "influence" that initially caused the discharge of merely one neuron . . . Thus, the neurophysiological hypothesis is that the 'will' modifies the spatio-temporal activity of the neuronal network by exerting spatio-temporal 'fields of influence' that become affected through this unique detector function of the active cerebral cortex.'

"Eccles is a determined opponent of the positivist argument that while 'brain' is a reality, 'mind' is a fiction-- a ghost in the machine:

'It will be objected [he writes] that the essence of the hypothesis is that mind produces changes in the matter-energy system of the brain and hence must be itself in that system . . . But this deduction is merely based on the present hypotheses of physics. Since these postulated "mind-influences" have not been detected by any existing physical instrument, they have necessarily been neglected in constructing the hypotheses of physics . . . It is at least claimed that the active cerebral cortex could be a detector of such 'influences', even if they existed at any intensity below that detectable by physical instruments. It would appear that it is the sort of machine a 'ghost' could operate.'

"So far Eccles has been discussing the action of individual minds on their 'own' brains. In the concluding sections of his book, however, he lifts this restriction and includes ESP and PK into the theory . . . He believes that ESP and PK are weak and irregular manifestations of the same principle which allows an individual's mental volition to influence his own material brain, and the material brain to give rise to conscious experiences. He also reminds us of an unduly neglected hypothesis, which Eddington formulated in 1939, of a 'correlated behavior of the individual particles of matter, which he assumed to occur for matter in liaison with mind. The behavior of such matter would stand in sharp contrast to the uncorrelated or random behavior of particles . . . postulated in physics'.

"Let us now return to Dobbs. Eccles seems to have deliberately abstained from giving any indication of the supposed nature of those 'influences' or 'influence fields' which are meant to serve as vehicles for the traffic between matter and mind, or mind and mind. Dobbs proposed to provide such a carrier by the psitron which, when it impinges on the 'critically poised' neutrons in the brain, can trigger off 'a cascade or chain reaction' of neural events."